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Improving an interface to increase control over interactions between existing product 
modules can create new product features which alter the basis of competition in ma-
ture (sub-)markets. We empirically examine the impact of interface innovation by new 
market entrants from Japan in the high-end, professional camera sub-market between 
1955 and 1974. Prior to 1960, the industry architecture of the professional camera 
sub-market was modular, dominated by German specialist body and specialist lens 
manufacturers. This market structure changed due to the success of integrated Japa-
nese start-ups who, from 1961, offered novel automated exposure features, facilitated 
by improving the existing interface between the camera body and lens, and by making 
this interface a proprietary standard. Their success broke the mirror between the in-
dustry architecture, which became vertically integrated, while the product architec-
ture remained modular. 
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“Breaking the Mirror”: Interface Innovation and Market Cap-
ture by Japanese Professional Camera Firms, 1955-1974 
 
1.  Introduction 
The mirroring hypothesis links product modularity with organizational modularity.  
In a recent review, Colfer and Baldwin (2016) observe there are two categories of 
cases that violate the mirroring hypothesis: (1) integrated organizations which 
produce modular products, and (2) modular organizations which produce integrated 
products. 
A key research question concerns the strategies which firms have employed in order 
to ‘break the mirror’. The rich case study of the professional camera sub-market, 
presented in this paper, contributes to our understanding of the type of strategies used 
by new market entrants to capture markets, and which can change the industry to one 
in which there is a dominance of integrated organizations producing modular 
products (case 1, above). 
During the late 1950s and 1960s, a number of new Japanese start-ups entered the 
professional camera sub-market and started to replace the existing mechanical 
aperture coupling lever1 (the interface between lens and camera body) with an 
electrical interface. This enabled information from a light metering module to be 
passed, either to a simple servo control of aperture blades in the lens, or, alternatively, 
to a simple servo control of the shutter mechanism to ensure correct exposure. 
 
                                                     
1 The aperture coupling lever was originally a purely mechanical interface between lens and 
body, controlling the opening of the lens aperture to ensure correct exposure for a given shut-
ter speed. 
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By improving the specification of an existing interface among the interacting physical 
components that make up the camera, Japanese firms were able to offer new features 
(‘service characteristics’) to consumers, while simultaneously making these interface 
improvements proprietary. The first key feature offered to professional photographers 
was automated exposure (AE). AE was attractive to professional photographers 
because it speeded up the operation of picture taking. In particular, it was popular 
amongst sports, newspaper, and wildlife photographers who were using single lens 
reflex (SLR) cameras. Professional photographers, however, wish (then as now) to 
retain the option of complete control over all aspects of picture taking. They need to 
be able to revert back to completely manual operation, quickly and easily. This was 
reflected in the early AE cameras which, apart from the introduction of simple servo 
controls and electrical interface, did not change in terms of its modular architecture, 
or its modules.  
The other aspect of this case study was the capture of the previously ‘open’ mechanical 
lens-body interface (the M42 screw thread interface) by a small set of proprietary 
(non-interoperable) bayonet lens-body interfaces with different configurations of 
electrical pin connectors that were introduced by those vertically integrated firms 
offering AE.  
The importance of interfaces to modularization is highlighted in the mirroring 
hypothesis literature (e.g. Langlois and Robertson 1992; Langlois 2002). The 
direction of change in industry architecture can change towards greater specialisation 
and modularity, driven by the creation of new product modules and/or an increase in 
the number of interfaces between modules. This pre-supposes that standards are open 
and allow interoperability between modules. However, the literature on standards 
competitions has highlighted the competitive advantage which firms can gain from 
introducing proprietary, non-interoperable standards that force consumers to choose 
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between the rival products offered by competing firms (e.g. Farrell and Saloner 1985; 
Swann 1987; Farrell and Saloner 1989). This changed the basis of competition in the 
industry, and the resulting shake-out of firms resulted in an industry structure 
dominated by vertically integrated firms. 
Deploying data envelope analysis (DEA), this paper investigates the importance of 
AE in altering the innovation trajectory of the professional camera industry.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the mirroring 
hypothesis literature. Section 3 discusses the competitive advantage of replacing a 
pre-existing interface design with a technological alternative. In the case of the post-
war development of the professional camera market, this involved the replacement of 
a mechanical interface between lens and camera body modules with an electrical in-
terface that could carry more information between these two modules. Using simple 
mechanical servo controls, this alternative interface facilitated the introduction of a 
new feature – automated exposure (AE). The case highlights the strategic advantages 
of integrated Japanese start-ups, and how these firms were able to exploit the weak-
nesses of the European modular specialists through their development of proprietary 
(non-interoperable) AE systems. The resulting standards competition drove out spe-
cialist body manufacturers who were unable to develop their own AE systems. 
Section 4 discusses exposure and the artistic parameters of the photographer when 
determining exposure. This paves the way for an appreciation of the attractiveness of 
AE to the professional photographer, discussed in section 5. This helps one appreciate 
why and when the photographer would wish to use AE and when to switch back to 
manual operation. The need to quickly switch between automated and manual modes 
directly influenced the early design set-up of AE by manufacturers. This is high-
lighted in the discussion of section 6, which examines the technical design of AE, as 
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introduced in 35mm SLR cameras. In section 6 we compare Design Structure Matri-
ces (DSMs) (Steward, 1981) listing the key technical variables of a manual SLR cam-
era, and the technical dependencies between those key variables, with that of early 
aperture-priority and shutter-priority SLR cameras. This highlights the (relatively) 
simple mechanical solutions that engineers came up with for achieving AE, given the 
user’s desire to switch between AE and manual operation. The analysis helps to clarify 
AE as an example of a new product feature facilitated by interface innovation, in which 
the pre-existing modular design configuration was adapted, as opposed to an archi-
tectural product change or an integrative change. 
Section 7 formally sets up our research hypotheses that the introduction of AE drove 
the industry dynamics following its introduction. Section 8 discusses the dataset and 
the statistical methods used to empirically test these hypotheses. We apply DEA to a 
dataset of 635 cameras listed in the annual Buyers Guide of Amateur Photographer 
magazine between 1955 and 1974 (inclusive). The results are reported in Section 9. 
Prior to the introduction of AE in 1961, the vast majority of cameras located on the 
efficiency frontier are manufactured by specialist modular European firms. After 1961 
the efficiency frontier is increasing populated by cameras with AE, which were over-
whelmingly produced by integrated Japanese firms. Section 10 concludes with a dis-
cussion of the implications of interface innovation for further research on standards, 
innovative product features, and the mirroring hypothesis. 
 
2.  Modularity and the mirroring hypothesis  
The mirroring hypothesis links product modularity with organizational modularity, 
i.e. the division of labour and knowledge across firms within an industry (see recent 
reviews of the literature by Colfer and Baldwin (2016) and Sorkun and Furlan (2016)).  
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Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) first formulated the ‘mirroring’ hypothesis that stand-
ardized component interfaces in a modular product architecture provide a form of em-
bedded coordination, which greatly reduces overt managerial control to achieve the 
coordination of product development. Subsequent contributors highlight varying as-
pects of this association. For example, Cabigiosu and Camuffo (2012) highlight the 
association between modular products and modular organizations, and Sorkun and 
Furlan (2017) report a direct relationship between product modularity and organiza-
tional modularity. For Lee and Berente (2012: p1428) “innovative efforts take place 
across organizations in a way that is generally isomorphic, or ‘mirrors,’ the structure 
of products that these firms produce”; for MacCormack et al. (2012: p1309) “loosely-
coupled organizations will develop more modular designs than tightly-coupled or-
ganizations”. 
Ulrich (1995) defines a product architecture as “the scheme by which the function of 
a product is allocated to physical components” (ibid, p.420). Following Simon (1962), 
the development of modular product architectures is viewed to be a rational response 
to product complexity. There exists an ‘ideal modular form’ for any product, in which 
interdependent components are grouped into distinct modules, and there are no de-
pendencies between these modules. Dependencies between components within a mod-
ule cluster are assumed to incur a low cost, while those between components in dif-
ferent modules are assumed to incur a high cost. 
The key advantage of a modular architecture is that improvements can be made to 
one module without needing to make changes to other modules (Simon 1962, 1976, 
1978; Henderson and Clark 1990; Ulrich 1995; Ulrich and Eppinger 2008), and recip-
rocal interdependencies between modules are minimised by common industry stand-
ards for hardware and/or software interfaces (Parnas 1972; Langlois and Robertson 
1992; Baldwin and Clark 2000).  
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The basic premise of the mirroring hypothesis is that, for any design, there is an effi-
cient way to arrange the different modules and distribute work across a network of 
producers. What is more, firms in an industry search for an optimal set of arrange-
ments over time and, as a consequence of organizational and product innovation, in-
dustry structure can change, sometimes dramatically.  
Baldwin and Clark (2000) and Baldwin (2008) discuss the relationship between 
thick/thin crossing points at the boundaries of modules, transaction costs between 
firms, and the network of organizational ties in an industry. It is suggested that a 
modular system is based on the ability to standardize and count what is transferred 
across boundaries, and on a division of cognitive labour across different organizations 
(due to physical and cognitive limitations, no single organization can carrying out all 
tasks). Module boundaries should be located where (a) standardizing and counting 
what is being transferred is relatively easy and inexpensive, and (b) the common in-
formation needed on both sides of the transaction is minimized, i.e., the division of 
cognitive labour is greatest. 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) refer to the costs of standardizing, counting, valuing and 
paying for goods as ‘mundane transaction costs, and propose that interfaces ought to 
be created where mundane transaction costs are at their lowest. Given dependencies 
between product components (see above), product modularity affects transaction 
costs. Notably, thin crossing points at the boundaries of modules have low transaction 
costs, while thick crossing points in the interior of modules have high-transaction 
costs for firms.  
Baldwin (2008) suggests that modularizations occur where transaction costs are low. 
New module boundaries therefore provide entry for competitors, and ‘breakpoints’ 
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where vertically integrated firms and industries may split apart. Langlois (2003) pre-
dicts a trend in industry architecture that mirrors the tendency for modularity to in-
crease over time in complex products. In a nascent industry, new firms tend to be 
vertically integrated as key new technological and other related knowledge tends to 
be scarce, and many of the problems involved in manufacture have not yet been re-
solved (also see Utterback and Abernathy 1975). Over time, the development of new 
interface standards enables specialisation in particular modules by firms, thereby 
gaining economies of scale in production, and this leads to a break down in vertical 
integration over time.  
In their recent review of the literature, Sorkun and Furlan (2017) find that most early 
empirical studies found evidence supporting the mirroring hypothesis. Amongst those 
cases where there is both high product modularity and high organizational 
modularity, they find three rationales: low coordination costs, operational benefits, 
and high strategic flexibility. 
Coordination costs can become too high for complex products. Adopting modular de-
signs can be a means of reducing coordination costs, as standardized interfaces embed 
the information necessary to coordinate different actors efficiently. Empirical papers 
on aircraft (Argyres, 1999), automobiles (Fine et al., 2005), personal computers (Hoe-
tker, 2006), and air-conditioning (Cabigiosu and Camuffo, 2012) suggest that adopt-
ing modular designs lowers coordination costs, as standardized interfaces embed the 
information necessary to coordinate different actors, enabling greater organisational 
modularity. 
Various operational benefits have been attributed to high product modularity - high 
organizational modularity situations.  For example, studies by Argyres (1999), 
Takeishi and Fujimoto (2001), and Hoetker et al. (2007) suggest standardized inter-
faces ensure a quality of externally sourced components, reducing monitoring costs 
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for buyers. Galvin and Morkel’s (2001) bicycle study indicates that specialization on 
specific modules can enable firms to develop more efficient processes, lowering sourc-
ing costs.  
Strategic flexibility is a third rationale. Organizational decoupling, facilitated by 
product modularity, helps the firm to mitigate operational risks and better meet cus-
tomers’ changing needs. In developing solutions for local customers, product devel-
opment teams mitigate against unexpected problems. There is also power in combin-
ing capabilities with other development groups, to develop new product configura-
tions. 
There exist examples, such as IT hardware and software sectors (Schilling and 
Steensma 2001; Sturgeon 2002; MacCormack et al. 2012), stereo hi-fi (Langlois and 
Robertson 1992), certain banking products and services (Jacobides 2005; Consoli 
2005), and automobiles (Ro et al. 2007) where an industrial sector initially comprised 
vertically integrated firms producing integrated products. The commercial success of 
new, modular products saw a rapid change in industry structure, with firms becoming 
specialised producers of specific modules.  
More recent empirical studies have been more critical of the mirroring hypothesis. 
One criticism is that knowledge boundaries rarely match organizational and product 
component boundaries, especially for firms who are system integrators (Brusoni et al. 
2001, and Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). For a system integrator, it is essential not 
only to have knowledge of the technological trajectories of the various key compo-
nents which make up a complex product but also the interdependencies between mod-
ules. Without this, an integrator will be unable to solve production problems, inte-
gration problems (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011), and/or deal with performance bottle-
necks when developing the next generation of the product (Ethiraj, 2007). 
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Staudenmayer et al. (2005) observe that most of the interdependencies between com-
ponents cannot be foreseen ex ante in the product design phase.  
Organisational modularity limits scale and scope, even of lead firms, providing an in-
centive for new or existing firms to undermine it. Christensen (2002) and Christensen 
et al. (2002) suggest the incentive may be strongest in sub-markets where demanding 
consumers seek improved functionality that is difficult to attain within a modular in-
dustry structure. In such sub-markets, innovators may engage in ‘module integration’. 
This involves the recombination, into a single module, of the functionality previously 
present in two or more modules. It enables engineers to maximise the degrees of free-
dom needed to “wring the best performance possible out of the available technology” 
(Christensen 2002, p.36). By contrast, a modular architecture inhibits engineers’ de-
grees of freedom, keeping them from reaching the technological frontier. Fixson and 
Park (2008) show how the introduction of an integral architecture for click shifting 
gears enhanced bicycle performance and led, in a few years, to a vertically structured 
and near monopolistic bicycle industry dominated by the innovative firm. Other ex-
amples of modular integration include disk drives and Microsoft Office suite (Chris-
tensen et al., 2002), building facilities (Cacciatori and Jacobides, 2005), the single 
drum washing machine design that replaced separate washer and spinning drums 
(Smith 2009), and the substitution of the modular desktop and monitor PC by laptops 
and tablets. 
This paper contributes to the recent literature by examining what can happen when 
there is innovation at a pre- existing interface. The prior literature has predominantly 
focused on the creation of new interfaces in order to make products more modular 
(e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin 2008). But what happens when changes made 
to an existing interface leads to new product features? Moreover, what happens when 
rival firms substitute an existing ‘open standard’ by a proprietary (non-interoperable) 
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standard interface between, in this case, lens and body? 
In prior studies, such as the IBM 360 mainframe (Ferguson and Morris, 1993; Pugh 
et al., 1991; Baldwin and Clark, 2000), and DIN and RCA connector interface 
standards between hi-fi components such as the amp, CD player, and tuner (Langlois 
and Robertson 1992), physical interface standards remain open. Yet the literature on 
standards competitions provides examples where open standards are replaced by 
proprietary (non-interoperable) standards. Notable examples in software are internet 
browsers (Windrum, 2004), and Apple’s proprietary DRM-AAC digital music 
standard (George and Chandak, 2006).  
Our case study provides an example of a physical, open interface standard – the M42 
screw thread with mechanical aperture coupling lever between lens and camera body 
– being replaced by proprietary bayonet lens-body interfaces with different 
configurations of electrical pin connectors. This strategy succeeded because 
consumers were attracted to a new feature that was made possible by the new 
interface: automated exposure (AE).  
3. Interface innovation and the camera industry 
The implications for competition and industry structure of technological substitution 
in a pre-existing interface – e.g. the replacement of a mechanical interface with an 
electrical interface – has not been considered in the prior mirroring literature. As dis-
cussed above, the ‘ideal’ modular product architecture is completely decomposable. It 
comprises a set of distinct, independent modules, and there are no dependencies be-
tween the modules (Simon 1962). In this idealised case, an interface ensures interop-
erability between modules but does not itself affect the function or the performance of 
the modules.  
A number of hardware/ software IT products, and modular hi-fi systems come close 
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to this ideal architecture. However, there are products that are not completely decom-
posable, i.e. in which interfaces do affect the functioning and the performance of mod-
ules. In case of cameras, an electric interface between lens and body can carry more 
information than a purely mechanical interface, and this made it possible to offer new 
product features without changing the overall product architecture or introducing 
new modules. If the new features facilitated by interface innovation are attractive to 
consumers, then a radical change in leadership and industry structure can occur.  
One way of viewing AE is as a simple control system; one that uses information from 
the exposure meter to coordinate of a set of pre-existing components within the lens 
(i.e. the lens blades) and the body (i.e. the shutter). Control systems are a particular 
class of innovation that is relatively understudied. Notable exceptions are Sosa et al. 
(2003, 2004) and Lee and Berente (2012). 
Sosa et al. (2003) introduced the notion of ‘integral architectures’, which they distin-
guish from modular architectures in the following way; “modular systems as those 
whose design interfaces with other systems are clustered among a few physically ad-
jacent systems, whereas integrative systems are those whose design interfaces span 
all or most of the systems that comprise the product due to their physically distributed 
or functionally integrative nature throughout the product.” (Sosa et al. 2003,p.p. 240-
241). They apply their concept to a case study of the Pratt & Whitney PW4098 large 
commercial aircraft engine (Sosa et al. 2003, 2004).  
The early shutter-priority and aperture-priority AE cameras were not integrative 
systems, nor were they more integrative in their lens-body interface than the previous 
generation of manual cameras. Rather, the early camera 'automation' devices required 
(in addition to an electrical interface)  relatively minor mechanical modifications to 
the pre-existing shutter control and pre-existing aperture control mechanisms used 
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in manual cameras (section 6 below). All of the other components and their functions 
in the lens and camera body remained the same as in manual cameras.  
It is illustrative to compare this with another major innovative camera product of the 
late 1960s, the Polaroid’s SX-70 camera (Garud and Munir 2008). That design was 
aimed at a different sub-market - the occasional amateur user. It was a simple to use 
point-and-shoot camera, light and portable, and could produce ‘instant images’. The 
ability to produce printed images required the development of a new product 
architecture. Unlike AE, it radically reconfigured the existing SLR design. To start 
with, a new type of film cartridge was developed that contained the chemicals needed 
to develop a set of 10 colour positive photographs in ambient light. This obviated the 
need to load and remove a 35m negative film cartridge (a common source of user 
error), and made pictures ‘instant’ as there was no need to send negatives away to be 
developed and printed onto colour positive paper. Another notable change was that 
the SX-70 had a simple fixed lens, which could not be changed. Finally, to insure 
against power loss due to battery wear, the battery was removed from the camera 
body to the film cartridge.  With each new cartridge there came a new battery to 
operate SX-70’s shutter, mirrors, film advance system and flash sequencer (Olshaker 
1978). Whilst the film and battery remained separate components, and the extent of 
their interdependence was not substantially greater than before, the nature of their 
interdependence had changed materially.  
As well as this being a less modular design than the SLR camera, there was a change 
in organizational modularity for this product. Implementing the innovation required 
intense boundary-spanning collaboration between Polaroid and key suppliers, such as 
Kodak for the new film technology. Polaroid ultimately found it necessary to become 
a more vertically integrated firm, and develop its own in-house film competences, 
because of problems in achieving necessary quantity and quality of film from its main 
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supplier, Kodak.  
The introduction of simple mechanical AE on SLR cameras did not involve, or require, 
a radical change in product architecture. Furthermore, the degree of product 
modularity did not change notably. In contrast to Christensen’s (2002) discussion of 
module integration, the lens and body modules remained completely separate. Any 
firm that knows the interface specification can supply either.  For example, a firm can 
make a lens body that accepts Nikon lenses, or else make lenses that work with a 
Nikon body. 
A key reason why Japanese firms maintained modularity and used a relatively simple, 
mechanical set-up for AE, is that professional photographers (then, as now) want to 
be able to switch instantly back to fully manual mode, when circumstances require 
(see section 6 below for a detailed discussion).  
The professional sub-market became more vertically integrated (less organizationally 
modular), as it did for the amateur Polaroid sub-market, but the driver of change was 
very different. In the professional camera sub-market, change was due to innovating 
firms successfully capturing what had previously been a single, open standard for the 
lens-body interface. There emerged a limited number of proprietary interface 
standards, each controlled by a different manufacturer. The key innovators of AE who 
pushed these proprietary interface standards were vertically integrated entrants from 
Japan. The resulting competition drove out specialist European and U.S. body 
manufacturers. This case study counters the proposition that modular production 
networks are particularly advantageous in industries where there is rapid 
technological change (cf. Langlois and Robertson, 1992). AE was to be the first in a 
series of innovations that eventually transformed cameras from a manually operated 
product to the highly automated, computer-controlled product that we see today. 
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Our proposed explanation of the change in industry structure differs from prior ac-
counts by historians such as Lewis (1991), Nelson (1998), Nakaoka et al. (2001), Al-
exander (2002), and Donzé (2011, 2014). These writers have highlighted the intro-
duction of mass manufacturing techniques, applied to precision engineering products, 
by Japanese firms, which gave them a cost advantage over established high-end Eu-
ropean and U.S. firms.  
At the outset of the post-war era, the camera industry was dominated by separate 
European and U.S. specialist lens and specialist body producers.2 The key technical 
challenge facing camera body specialists was the manufacture of accurate shutter 
speeds, and the challenge facing lens specialists was the precision grounding of glass 
lenses. This industry structure was consistent with the mirroring hypothesis.  
High-end German and Swiss camera manufacturers used artisan ‘kleinserien-produk-
tion’ in which small batches were produced with skilled labour.3 Hitherto, mass pro-
duction had only been applied to the production of simple, inexpensive cameras in the 
USA, most notably by Kodak. 
Mass precision manufacturing may well have enabled Japanese firms to quickly catch-
up to the quality of European and U.S. specialists but, we propose, it was interface 
innovation that facilitated the development of new product features that led to their 
dominance in the high-end, professional camera market. AE was the first of these 
novel product innovations. Following its success, Japanese firms pioneered further 
novel automation features, such as autofocusing, automated zoom lenses, and complex 
                                                     
2 A notable exception was Leica, which made 35mm rangefinder camera bodies and its own 
lenses (Fuhrman 1988). 
3 See Radkau (1989), Homburg (1991) and Abelshauser (1998, 2005) on the system of artisan 
‘kleinserien-produktion’ extensively found in German and Swiss manufacturing developed 
from the late 19th century onwards and how this differs to Fordist mass manufacturing 
(Hounshell 1984; Scranton 2007). 
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multi-zone metering. All of these were predicated on the more effective electrical con-
trol of the lens-body interface. 
Where integrated Japanese firms were willing, and able, to invest in the R&D required 
for AE, European lens and body specialists failed to coordinate a response. Reasons 
for technological hold-up lay on both sides. Leading camera body specialists in Ger-
many and elsewhere had built their success on mechanical engineering. They did not 
develop quickly enough the capabilities required to match their Japanese rivals. Spe-
cialist lens manufacturers were equally slow to develop AE capabilities. These firms 
were further disadvantaged by the fact that, rather than there being a single, open 
electrical interface standard, there were a set of rival, non-interoperable interface 
standards.4  
Integrated Japanese firms such as Nikon, Canon, Minolta and Pentax each has its own 
interface arrangement of electrical communication pins for lens and body. It was not 
economic for specialist lens producers to reverse engineer and provide compatible 
third-party lenses for all of the rival interfaces. Even where lens specialists focused on 
one of the AE options, photographers who purchased third party lenses frequently 
encountered compatibility issues because the specialist lens firm did not have access 
to the lens/body communication specifications of the Japanese standards setter. An-
other common problem was backwards compatibility between older third party lenses 
and newer bodies with incremental updates on the proprietary standard. 
Industry specialisation thus proved to be the Achilles heel of German lens and body 
manufacturers who were unable to develop a coordinated response to the development 
                                                     
4 See Farrell and Saloner 1989 for a discussion of coordination problems faced by agents wish-
ing to switch from one standard to another. 
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of camera-lens automation by new Japanese firms. German firms declined in the pro-
fessional sub-market and also in the amateur sub-market. In 1964, the value of global 
exports of all camera types by Japanese firms stood at 15 billion yen, slightly larger 
than that of West German firms at 14 billion yen. German exports remained flat 
through to 1974, rising to just 21 billion yen, while Japanese exports increased by 
over 500% to 92 billion yen (Nelson 1998).  
 
4. Exposure and the artistic choice of the photographer 
In order to understand the attractiveness of AE to the user, it is necessary to appre-
ciate the issues involved in correctly exposing a piece of light sensitive film, and the 
artistic choices involved in selecting particular lens apertures and shutter speeds. 
The combination of lens aperture (f-stop) and shutter speed (measured in seconds) 
determine the amount of light that passes through the camera and on to a piece of 
light sensitive film (or a sensor on a modern digital camera).  Given the light sensi-
tivity of the film (its ISO), and the amount of light being reflected from the subject 
that one is wishing to capture on the image, there will be a number of combinations 
of f-stop lens aperture and shutter speed that ensure a correctly exposed image i.e. an 
image that is not too bright (overexposed) or too dark (underexposed). In images 
which are overexposed and underexposed, a lot of the information and contrast that 
makes a good image worth viewing is lost. 
A light meter measures the level of the light, and indicates an ‘exposure value’ (EV) 
at a particular ISO. Suppose the combination of film ISO and light gives an exposure 
value of EV11. 
Table 1 indicates the set of combinations of numerical camera settings of shutter speed 
 18 
and f-stop which produce a set of equivalent exposure settings. F is the f-stop number 
of the lens aperture, and T is the shutter speed. So, for example, the combination of a 
large lens aperture of f/2 and fast shutter speed of 1/500 of a second, lets through an 
equivalent amount of light as the combination of a small lens aperture of f/22 and a 
slow shutter speed of 1/4 of a second.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 Here 
---------------------------- 
The relationship between F and T is 𝐸𝑉 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝐹 𝑇⁄ . Rearranging, 2EV = F2/T so 
EV is an exponent power of two. Stops of shutter speed affect exposure in powers of 
two. F/stops are numbered incrementing by the square root of 2, then each squared 
number is a power of two.  
A set of artistic choices are involved when selecting one of these combinations of ap-
erture and shutter speed. The aperture of the lens (N) affects the depth of field of the 
image. For example, a picture taken at a wide aperture, such as f/2, will have a shallow 
depth of field. This is a useful choice when taking portraits, as a shallow depth of field 
means the features of the subject (the person) are sharp and the background is soft 
and blurred (this is known as bokeh). This isolates the subject from the background, 
ensuring the viewer’s eye focuses on the features of the person.  
The landscape photographer makes a very different choice. She/he wants all subjects 
within their image to be in sharp focus.  Hence, they will select a small aperture, such 
as f/11 or f/16, to ensure a large depth of field. The downside of this is the relatively 
slow shutter speeds involved (1/15 second at f/11, and 1/8 second at f/16 for EV11). 
As indicated in Figure 1, any moving object within the image is liable to be blurred.   
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Capturing a relatively fast moving subject – such as a ball moving through the air or 
a bird in flight – is essential for sports and wildlife photography. Hence, the photog-
rapher must select a very fast shutter speed, such as 1/1000 second or 1/500 second. 
The downside of this is that they must accept, at EV11, a shallow depth of field in the 
image due to the need for a large aperture (e.g. f/1.4 at 1/1000 second, or f/2 at 1/500 
second). 
5. Benefits of AE for the professional user 
Having discussed the exposure values and choices between different combinations of 
lens aperture and shutter speed, we can consider the advantages to the photographer 
of early AE systems. 
With a manual camera, the photographer needs to adjust both the lens aperture via 
an aperture ring located on the outer body of the lens and the shutter speed via a 
control dial located on the camera body.  
Another factor which the photographer needs to consider is changing light condi-
tions. For example, on a partially cloudy day the light (EV values) can change rapidly 
as the sun periodically breaks through clouds. When this occurs, the photographer 
needs to adjust both lens aperture and shutter speeds in line with changing light con-
ditions. 
Compared to a manual camera, AE significantly speeds up the time to set up a photo-
graph and significantly reduces the likelihood of an incorrectly exposed image. This 
is particularly attractive for press photographers, sports, and other professional pho-
tographers who must capture an image in a split instant.  
Having said this, it is important for the professional photographer (then, as it is still) 
to be able to turn off the automated system and to manually set the aperture and 
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shutter speed him/herself.  As we shall see, the early AE systems were set up in a way 
that the camera modules could easily revert back to all-manual operation. 
There are a number of conditions under which a user may wish to revert back to 
manual mode. The most common of these are low light or snow conditions, when it 
is more practical for the photographer to set their own exposures. Some photogra-
phers also liked to deliberately ‘push’ film above its native speed, deliberately under-
exposing the film negative and then giving it a longer development time. Others liked 
to ‘pull’ film; overexposing the negative and shortening development time.  
The earliest AE cameras offered one of two alternatives of automation: ‘shutter-pri-
ority’ and ‘aperture-priority’. With shutter-priority control, the photographer selects 
a shutter speed based on an artistic decision about whether to freeze or blur motion 
in the image. The camera contains a servo mechanism that controls the positon of the 
lens blades.  This sets a lens aperture that is appropriate for the correct film exposure 
at a given EV level. 
With an aperture-priority AE system, by contrast, the photographer decides on the 
depth of field and selects an appropriate f-stop. With this type of AE system, the cam-
era contains a servo mechanism that controls the shutter speed. An appropriate shut-
ter speed is automatically selected for a given EV level.  
By 1974, leading Japanese manufacturers were divided into one or other camp. Canon, 
Konica, Miranda, Petri, Ricoh and Topcon offered shutter-priority AE, and Asahi 
Pentax, Chinon, Cosina, Fujica, Minolta, Nikkormat and Yashica offered aperture-
priority AE. 
 
6.  Technical design of AE 
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In this section of the paper we critically analyse the technical design of the early AE 
systems. The analysis helps to clarify AE as an example of a new product feature 
(service characteristic) facilitated by innovation on a pre-existing interface as opposed 
to an architectural product change or an integrative change. It is not, as discussed, an 
integrative system innovation (Sosa et al., 2003). Cameras were not integrative sys-
tems prior to the development of AE, and the early AE cameras were not more inte-
grative in their interfaces than manual cameras. To illustrate this, we shall compare 
the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) of a manual SLR camera with the Design Struc-
ture Matrices of aperture-priority and shutter-priority AE SLRs. The addition of new 
design variables (and their dependencies) are shown in red and eliminated design var-
iables in grey.  
Figure 1 presents a DSM (Steward, 1981) listing the key technical variables of a man-
ual SLR camera, and the technical dependencies between those key variables. For ex-
ample, the size of the aperture diaphragm regulates the amount of light that passes 
through a lens, affecting the film's exposure. The aperture blades (row 3) are mechan-
ically controlled by an aperture ring on the outside on the lens case (row 1). The 
aperture ring has a set of f-stop markings. By adjusting the aperture ring, the user 
mechanically adjusts the position of the aperture blades and, hence, the size of aper-
ture diaphragm.  
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
---------------------------- 
Of particular note is the through-the-lens (TTL) exposure metering feature offered 
by manual SLR cameras (row 18). As discussed above, this is a distinguishing feature 
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of the SLR design compared to twin lens reflex (TLR) cameras. The exposure meter-
ing feature has a number of dependencies.  
Light passing through the lens strikes a CdS photocell (row 16), changing its conduc-
tivity, affecting the flow of electricity from a battery (row 15). This current caused an 
ammeter coil to rotate, deflecting a needle within an exposure meter readout (row 18). 
This meter readout indicates whether a particular combination of lens aperture and 
shutter speed will produce the correct exposure for a film ISO (preset by the user – 
row 17), or will otherwise produce an under- or overexposed image (see the example 
EV11 Table 1 above).  The photographer would manually adjust the lens aperture 
and/or shutter speed until the correct exposure is indicated.  
AE systems make use of this TTL metering system. The very first AE SLRs were 
shutter-priority cameras, and were entirely mechanical. When the user pressed the 
shutter release, a trapping blade pinned the metering needle in position. Other me-
chanical devices, then communicated the relative position of the trapped needle to the 
lens, where a servo mechanism set the lens diaphragm to the correct aperture. This 
servo mechanism overrides the lens aperture that had been set by the user via the lens 
ring. 
The subsequent generation of cameras introduced microchips to control many of these 
functions. One of the problems of purely mechanical parts is wear and tear, leading to 
inaccuracies in exposure over time. The basic principles, however, remain the same. 
For example, with aperture-priority AE, the user selects the lens aperture via the lens 
ring. This information is passed to the controlling microcircuit as electrical inputs 
through variable resistors. A light reading from a photocell generates an electric cur-
rent in response to the amount of light passing through the lens diaphragm. This is 
the basis for the timing of the shutter. Shutter speeds can be continually variable.  
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Figures 2 and 3 are DSMs for aperture-priority and shutter-priority AE camera de-
signs respectively. Variables that differ to those of the manual camera (Figure 1) are 
highlighted in red, as are any differences between the interactions between key vari-
ables. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2 and 3 Here 
                                               ---------------------------- 
From these figures we see that early AE is not an integrative system, nor does it make 
the SLR design more integrative in its modules. The one mechanical interface be-
tween the lens and camera body has been replaced with an electrical interface that is 
able to carry more information. 
As noted in the previous section, the set–up of the early AE designs were simple and 
easily allowed for the user to revert back to ‘manual mode’. The mechanical AE de-
signs either added an additional servo mechanism to control the shutter mechanism 
(Figure 2), or else a servo mechanism to control the lens aperture (Figure 3).  
In the aperture-priority AE camera (Figure 2), the photographer sets the f-stop on 
the aperture ring (row 1) based on his/her artistic decision regarding the depth of 
field. Using EV information provided by the exposure meter (row 11, column 18), a 
servo mechanism controls the focal plane shutter (row 13, column 11). This automat-
ically adjusts the shutter speed to achieve a correct exposure for the user-selected lens 
aperture. This mechanical servo control for the shutter (row 11) is the one, new me-
chanical component not present in a manual SLR (Figure 1). 
Turning to the shutter-priority AE camera design (Figure 3), the one component that 
is new is a mechanical servo to control the aperture of the aperture blades (row 2). 
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Here the photographer sets the shutter speed (row 10) based on his/her artistic deci-
sion regarding the freezing or blurring of motion. Once again, EV information pro-
vided by the exposure meter readout (is used, but this time it is an input for a servo 
mechanism that controls the lens blades (row 2, column 18). 
The one other key change that occurred, in both AE designs, was the replacement of 
the previously universal M42 screw thread interface standard between lens and body 
(row 7, Figure 1) with a bayonet-mount interface that included electrical pin connect-
ors (row 7, Figures 2 and 3).  
These connectors ensure that information passes between the lens and the camera 
body. A bayonet mount is needed in order to ensure that the (male) pins on the lens 
match exactly with corresponding (female) receptors on the camera body. In an aper-
ture-priority AE camera (Figure 2), information from the lens aperture (set by the 
photographer) is carried to the exposure meter readout. In a shutter-priority AE cam-
era (Figure 3), information from the exposure meter readout is carried to the servo 
mechanism controlling the lens blades. 
The above matrices help us clarify the key arguments made in this paper. Firstly, the 
matrices help to clarify AE as an example of a new product feature due to interface 
innovation. The pre-existing components of the shutter mechanism and the lens ap-
erture were adapted. There was not an architectural change to the manual SLR de-
sign. Additionally, AE is different to integrative systems discussed by Sosa el al. 
(2003, 2004). 
In principle, a single configuration of male and female connectors could have provided 
a common, universal standard for all lens and body manufacturers. However, as pre-
viously discussed, Japanese firms such as Canon, Minolta, Nikon, and Pentax chose to 
introduce their own pin configurations. What is more, they introduced their own, 
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proprietary bayonet mount shapes. This meant that lenses from one firm could not be 
attached to the camera body of another, e.g. Nikon lenses could not be attached to a 
Canon body, and vice versa. This forced consumers to choose lens and body combina-
tions from a single firm.  
This strategically altered the nature of competition in the professional camera sub-
sector, from an open interface standard (M42) with which any make of lens could be 
used on any make of camera, to a contemporaneous standards battle where consumers 
were forced to choose between the lens/body combinations of rival companies.  
As discussed in section 2, the winners of this standards battle were the vertically in-
tegrated Japanese start-ups who could forge ahead with AE thanks to in-house capa-
bilities in both lens and body manufacture. The losers were the previously successful 
specialists who produced either lenses or camera bodies. This shift in competitive ad-
vantage within the industry adversely affected the fortunes of Japanese specialists as 
much as it did European and U.S. specialists. The following Section discusses the hy-




There are two ‘pure’ innovation strategies that a firm can use to move towards the 
quality/price efficiency frontier. The first pure strategy is to develop a process inno-
vation which increases the efficiency of manufacturing giving the firm a cost/price 
advantage. The second pure strategy is to produce a camera with higher quality prod-
uct characteristics. Ceteris paribus, this will tend to cost more to manufacture, and so 
the firm will need to charge a high price to cover the additional costs.  
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As noted, Lewis (1991), Nakaoka et al. (2001), Alexander (2002), and Donzé (2014) 
have suggested that the development of mass precision manufacturing from the 1950s 
onwards enabled Japanese entrants to manufacture cameras with competitive 
price/quality characteristics to European and U.S. firms. In this case, one would ex-
pect to find Japanese cameras at the quality/price efficiency frontier, from 1955 to 
1974, across all four camera types (35mm SLR, medium format TLR, medium format 
SLR and medium format Hasselblad-type cameras). 
The proposition forwarded in this paper is that the introduction of AE, a radical prod-
uct innovation, drove the industry dynamics in two high-end, professional camera 
formats (35mm SLR and medium format TLR cameras). If this is the case, one would 
expect to see a different pattern in the DEA estimates between camera types. In the 
35mm SLR and TLR camera types where AE was introduced, we would expect to see 
an increasing number of integrated firms located at the efficiency frontier from 1961 
onwards. By contrast, in the medium format SLRs and medium format Hasselblad-
type cameras where AE was not introduced, one would expect to continue to see sep-
arate specialist firms at the efficiency frontier throughout the 1955 to 1974 period.  
This provides us with three testable hypotheses, 
H1. In medium format SLRs and medium format Hasselblad-type cameras, models with 
an efficiency score = 1 are produced by specialist body manufacturers from 1955 – 1974. 
H2. In 35mm SLR and medium format TLR cameras, models with an efficiency score 
= 1 are produced by specialist firms in the 1955 – 1960 period. 
H3. In 35mm SLR and medium format TLR cameras, models with an efficiency score 
= 1 are produced by integrated firms in the 1961 – 1974 period. 
 27 
 
8. Dataset and methods 
8.1 Data 
Our dataset is collected from information published in the UK consumer magazine 
Amateur Photographer. This is a well-known, reputable, and publicly available source 
for contemporary secondary data. Each year, Amateur Photographer produced an an-
nual ‘Buyers Guide’ listing makes, models, recommended retail prices, and features. 
Data was taken from the guides published from 1955 to 1974 inclusive.  
Our dataset comprises four camera types which were used by professional photogra-
phers in this period: 35mm SLRs, medium format SLRs, medium format TLRs, and 
medium format Hasselblad-type cameras (Time-Life 1970; Hicks 1986; Langford 
1987).5 Of these formats, 35mm SLRs also became popular amongst amateurs from 
the mid-1970s onwards. We therefore analyse data for the period 1955 to 1974. The 
first issue of the Guide was 1955. The first model with AE that is listed in our dataset 
is a Japanese 35mm SLR camera, released in 1961. We use the cut-off point of 1974 
because up to this point AE systems were introduced on higher priced cameras, aimed 
at professional users. After 1974, AE became increasingly prevalent on SLRs aimed 
at the amateur user, such as the Pentax ME (introduced in 1976) and the ME Super 
(introduced 1979) which was the largest selling SLR of all time. This is consistent 
with other industries in which R&D costs are recouped by first offering novel features 
in higher priced versions of a product (Baumol 2010).  
                                                     
5 Camera types not used by professional photographers are excluded from the sample. These 
include box camera, folding camera, 126 and 110 cartridge, and non-reflex 35mm and medium 
format, and half-frame cameras. 
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As a data source, Amateur Photographer offers a number of advantages. First, the data 
is consistent and complete. Second, the use of an independent, publicly available 
source enables other researchers to access the same information to replicate results. 
Third, the magazine reports price and the performance features which manufacturers 
use to convey to the consumer the quality of their product designs and which con-
sumers use in their decision-making.  
Our dataset contains 1,816 different listings for 635 distinct camera models. Each 
model tends to be present in more than one year. Also, manufacturers often offered 
consumers different lens options. Bundles with faster lenses were more expensive. 
Hence, we have 1,816 complete listings for price and seven characteristic variables lens 
speed, shutter speed, interchangeable lenses (IL), internal metering, electronic shutter, auto-
matic exposure, and built-in motor. These characteristics were found to be important 
quality indicators in studies of the amateur camera sub-market by Alexander (2002), 
Windrum (2005), and Donzé (2014). The dataset also contains discrete variable infor-
mation on country of origin, manufacturer’s name, and camera type. 
The variable price is the manufacturers recommended retail price and is reported in 
UK pounds sterling. All model prices are deflated using the official UK deflator, with 
1974 as the base period. The variable shutter speed is the number of stops offered on 
the camera body. Each stop is a halving/doubling of light exposure onto the film. lens 
speed is a continuous variable containing information on the speed of the standard lens 
that is sold with the camera body. This is the f value of the lens at open aperture. Five 
product characteristics are dichotomous variables. AE takes a value of 1 if the camera 
model had an AE system (whether shutter-priority or aperture-priority) and a value 
of 0 otherwise; IL takes a value of 1 if the model allows for interchangeable lenses, 
and a value of 0 if there is a fixed lens; internal metering takes a value of 1 if the camera 
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body has in-built exposure metering and 0 otherwise; built-in motor takes a value of 1 
if the camera came with a motor for automatically winding on film between shots and 
0 otherwise; and electronic shutter takes a value of 1 if the focal plane shutter in the 
camera body is electronically controlled and a value of 0 if it is mechanically con-
trolled. 
The four camera types in our dataset differ in their degree of modularity. At one end 
of the spectrum is the TLR camera type originally invented by Rollei. These typically 
had non-interchangeable lenses. At the other end of the spectrum, the Hasselblad 
camera type is the most modular of designs ever invented, with interchangeable view-
finders, film magazines, and lenses.  
 
8.2 DEA model 
In this paper we use non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to identify 
the most efficient camera models over the sample period. The advantage of DEA is 
that one can include, within the same analysis, the effects of process innovations that 
affect productivity as well as product innovations that improve the quality of product 
features.  
The technique used in this paper is the same as Farrell’s (1957) non-parametric tech-
nique for measuring productive efficiency except that here there are multiple outputs 
(product characteristics) and one input (price). Prior applications of DEA to the meas-
urement of product competitiveness using price as the only input and product char-
acteristics as the outputs include Swann (1987) for fridges and fridge-freezers, Doyle 
and Green (1991) for computer printers, and Fernandez-Castro and Smith (2002) for 
cars. Applied in this way, the technique compares competing products across a num-
ber of different characteristics and identifies the most efficient products. A decision-
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making unit (DMU) is measured by its relative distance to the efficient frontier which 
is constructed from observations of comparable units. In the context of modelling 
cameras, the DMUs are the individual camera models. The closer the camera model 
to the frontier, the better the camera will be since it will provide more product char-
acteristics for a given price. An efficient camera model will operate at a point on the 
frontier and receive an efficiency score of 1. A score below 1 indicates that the camera 
model is operating below the frontier and hence, is inefficient relative to comparable 
units. In the context of our data, the linear programming model is configured so as to 
determine how much the price could contract if used efficiently in order to achieve the 
same level of product characteristics. The efficiency score therefore becomes a meas-
ure of how competitively the product is priced given the product characteristics. DEA 
is particularly useful in that it can accommodate multiple input-output situations 
whilst still yielding a single measure of relative performance. Moreover, this method-
ology does not require an a priori specification of the weights assigned to the inputs 
and outputs. We estimate a variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA, allowing for increas-
ing and decreasing returns (see Appendix). 
DEA has a number of advantages over parametric hedonic regression. There is a tra-
dition of estimating an average price function (of a particular form) to price and qual-
ity data and, following Cowling and Rayner (1970) measuring the competitiveness of 
rival products in terms of the hedonic regression residuals. There are a number of 
recognised limitations with this estimation method (Chow 1967; Griliches 1971; 
Swann and Taghavi 1992; Pakes 2003). First, whilst a product may be competitive 
relative to the average, it may never be bought because it is uncompetitive relative to 
its closest rival. The rational consumer would choose the most efficient or competitive 
product. Second, the estimated hedonic price function is an envelope of diverse firm 
cost functions and consumer indifference curves, reflecting more the diversity of 
 31 
agents than the functional form of individual curves (Swann and Taghavi 1992, p.16).  
Non-parametric DEA for measuring efficiency is preferred to parametric Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) since the latter requires one to assume a functional form for 
the input-output relationship. The DEA approach allows the shape of the frontier to 
be responsive to product innovations. In addition, the competitiveness of a particular 
product is assessed by reference to the immediately neighbouring products in terms 
of their product specification, rather than the whole market, as summarised in the 
parametric function. 
9. Results 
9.1 Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics for the period averages of the variables used in the estimation 
are given in Table 2. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 Here 
---------------------------- 
As noted, we have 635 different camera models over the entire sample period. These 
tend to be present in more than one year, with different lens bundles offered at differ-
ent prices. Hence, we have a total of 1,816 observations on our set of price and the 
seven characteristic variables lens, shutter speed, electronic shutter, automatic exposure, in-
terchangeable lens, internal metering and built-in motor. Table 3 shows the number of 
camera models in each model type. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 Here 
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---------------------------- 
The 635 cameras originated from 15 different countries. Table 4 shows the total num-
ber of camera listings in our dataset (i.e. all body/lens bundles offered over multiple 
years) by country of origin. As can be seen, the largest number of camera models 
originated from West Germany and Japan. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 Here 
---------------------------- 
The average time between a camera being first being listed and eventually being re-
moved from the listings is approximately 2 years and 11 months. The median period 
is 2 years. For cameras featuring AE, the median period is 4 years. There is a signifi-
cant amount of entry and exit of camera models over the period 1955 - 1974. In 1955, 
52 cameras are listed. In 1974, this number had increased to 117 listed cameras. The 
total number of new models introduced between 1955 and 1974 was 583, of which 
Japan accounted for 344 and West Germany 112 new models. Hence, the total number 
of models that exit the sample is 518. Of the total exits, 250 are Japanese models and 
121 are West German models. This higher turn-over rate is indicative of firms that 
are engaged in higher rates of product innovation and/or a higher rate of firm entry 
and exit amongst Japanese firms than amongst West German firms.  
Turning to the number of manufacturers, there are 70 different manufacturers in our 
dataset. Table 5 reports the number of manufacturers by country of origin. The larg-
est number of manufacturers is in Japan, followed by West Germany. On average, a 
firm manufactures 23 different cameras over the 20 year period. The median number 
of cameras is 20.   
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---------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 Here 
---------------------------- 
Over the period 1955 – 1974, 61 new manufacturers enter the market. Of this number, 
41 are Japanese. Conversely, 46 manufacturers exit the market over this period, of 
which 15 are Japanese.  
Figure 4 presents the number of manufacturers by national origin in each year. It 
highlights the dramatic change in fortunes of West German and Japanese firms dur-
ing this period. The number of West German firms rises up to 1960, reaching a peak 
of 17 independent firms manufacturing cameras. Thereafter the number of West Ger-
man firms collapses until, by 1974, there are just 4 remaining surviving firms. Japa-
nese firms come to dominate this sub-market. There is a fall in the number of Japanese 
manufacturers between 1958 and 1968, from 19 to 12 firms, but the number of active 
Japanese firms rises thereafter.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
---------------------------- 
The distribution of the number of camera models by manufacturer is listed in Table 
6. The majority of manufacturers produce between 1 and 5 camera models. How-
ever, two manufacturers produce over 40 different camera models.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 Here 
---------------------------- 
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Figure 5 shows the annual number of camera models listed from Japan, West Ger-
many and all other countries. There is an upward trend in the number of Japanese 
models over time. The number of West German cameras per year is reasonably con-
sistent up to 1965, and thereafter starts to fall year upon year. Elsewhere in the world 
this begins a little earlier, in 1962. The increasing share of models produced in Japan 
is an important indicator of the success of these firms in outperforming rivals in the 
professional sub-market, and is corroborated by existing data on the increasing inter-
national market shares of Japanese firms (Nelson 1998; Windrum 2005). 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
---------------------------- 
In order to analyse this general trend in greater detail, Figure 6 presents the annual 
number of camera models by country for each camera type. The number of medium 
format SLR and Hasselblad-type models offered each year is very small (between one 
and seven models per year). It is the growth in the number of 35mmm SLR models 
that is driving the overall trend. The number of SLR models offered by Japanese firms 
rose from zero in 1955 to over 80 in 1974. The number of SLR models offered by 
West German firms plateaued at around 20 between 1961 and 1965, after which the 
numbers fell year upon year.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 Here 
---------------------------- 
There is a switch of production from medium format TLRs to 35mm SLR cameras 
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over this twenty year period. The number of models offered by West German, Japa-
nese and all other countries falls notably over the entire period. The figures for Japa-
nese manufactured TLRs are particularly notable. In 1958 there were 21 different 
models manufactured in Japan. This is far larger than any other camera type that year. 
In 1974, just four TLRs in our dataset were Japanese. This suggests that, in order to 
survive, Japanese firms that began by manufacturing and exporting TLRs must have 
switched to the production of 35mm SLRs. 
Pricing is of particular interest to the argument that mass precision manufacturing 
gave Japanese firms a significant cost-price advantage over European and USA. rivals. 
The average for West German manufacturers is £218.66, while the average for Jap-
anese manufacturers is £185.96 (Table 1). Yet the relative average price of Japanese 
cameras was not consistently lower than manufacturers in other countries, or even 
West German firms throughout the entire period. 
Consider each of the four camera types in our dataset – i.e. Medium format SLR, Has-
selblad-type, medium format TLR, and 35mm SLR camera types - in Figure 7. In 
medium format SLR cameras, average Japanese cameras are lower than those from 
other countries from 1959 to 1967 but become higher thereafter. In Hasselblad type 
cameras they are consistently lower than West German producers of this camera type, 
but are not lower than from manufacturers in the ‘rest of the world’ (which includes 
Hasselblad itself). In TLRs and 35mm SLR types, the picture is similar. 
These data provide mixed evidence for the proposition that mass quality manufactur-
ing was the primary factor explaining the success of new Japanese entrants. From the 
mid-1960s, the trend in each of the four camera types is an upward movement in the 
average prices of Japanese cameras. This is consistent with a repositioning of Japanese 
firms as leading-edge product innovators who incur higher costs as a consequence.  
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---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 Here 
---------------------------- 
We now turn to data on cameras with automatic exposure (AE). Table 7 reports, for 
each year, the number of new cameras that feature AE. Information is provided on the 
country of origin and the type of camera. 61 new cameras featuring AE (9.6% of the 
total) were introduced between 1955 and 1974.6 Of this total, 56 were manufactured 
by a Japanese company. Just 6 models were manufactured by a West German com-
pany. It highlights the inability of West German firms to develop AE over time. No 
manufacturer from any other country was capable of developing AE in our sample 
period. 
This information clearly indicates the dominance that integrated firms in Japan had 
over specialists (whether from Europe, Japan, or the USA.). The number of new mod-
els featuring AE increases dramatically at the end of our data period, with 10 new 
models featuring AE introduced in 1973 and 23 introduced in 1974. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 Here 
---------------------------- 
 
9.2 DEA Results  
Table 8 provides data on the camera models estimated to lie on the efficiency frontier, 
                                                     
6 6% of all camera listings have AE (see Table 5). The difference between the two figures 
reflects the larger number of different lens-body combinations offered with non-AE cameras 
than with AE cameras.  
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by year, for medium format SLR, and Hasselblad-type cameras. Table 12 provides 
data for 35mm SLR and TLR type cameras. The two columns indicate the number of 
firms from each country whose models are located on the frontier. The third column 
indicates the number of these firms that were integrated body and lens producers. The 
fourth and fifth column indicate the number of cameras that feature AE and of these, 
the number manufactured by integrated firms. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Tables 8 and 9 Here 
---------------------------- 
Examining Table 9, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1. Between 1955 and 1970, 
the only firms producing cameras at the efficiency frontier in medium format SLR and 
Hasselblad-type cameras are specialist body firms. These were produced by UK, West 
and East German, Swedish, and Japanese body specialists. In 1971, two Japanese in-
tegrated manufacturers enter; Pentax with its 6x7 medium format SLR and Mamiya 
with it RB67 Hasselblad-type camera. Each remains at the efficiency frontier through 
to the end of the sample period. We note that both of these firms had gained experi-
ence producing other camera types used by professionals. Mamiya was an established 
manufacturer of TLR and 35mm SLR cameras, and Pentax of 35mm SLR cameras. 
There is evidence to support Hypothesis 2 that leading edge producers of 35mm SLR 
and medium format TLR cameras in the pre-AE years (i.e. prior to 1961) tend to be 
specialist body manufacturers. 18 of the 21 cameras on the 35mm SLR frontier from 
1955 to 1958 are produced by specialists. The remaining 3 cameras were produced by 
Zeiss Ikon, the West German integrated firm. The cameras produced by integrated 
Japanese firms, first appear on the SLR frontier in 1959 and 1960. Yet the majority of 
cameras on the frontier in these years continue to be made by specialists – 7 of the 10 
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cameras in 1959 and 13 of the 15 cameras in 1960. 
Some integrated Japanese firms were faster in developing highly efficient TLR cam-
eras. Still, specialist firms made the majority of TLR cameras on the efficiency frontier 
from 1955 to 1959.  
Our findings strongly support Hypothesis 3 that the development of AE gave firms – 
nearly all of whom were integrated producers – a competitive advantage. Although 
there were relatively few 35mm SLR cameras with AE listed in our sample (Table 6), 
the estimated DEA VRS models indicate that many of these models are located on the 
efficiency frontier (Table 12). While AE on its own was not sufficient to ensure the 
competitiveness of a camera, the ability to offer this feature did confer a price-quality 
advantage. 
The findings also highlight the success of integrated Japanese firms in developing 
competitive AE SLRs compared to specialists in other countries, and specialists in 
Japan. These are the leading edge cameras on which Canon, Nikon, Pentax, Minolta, 
and Mamiya grew to displace German and USA SLR manufacturers. There are just 
two 35mm SLR with AE produced by non-integrated firms. One was produced by 
Wirgin, a German body specialist firm, and the other was produced by the Japanese 
specialist Miranda.  
Turning to TLR cameras, there are just two TLR cameras in the sample that feature 
AE (Table 6), the Rollei Magic II and the Yashica E (Heiberg 1979). Both are esti-
mated to be at the TLR frontier during the years they are listed for sale. As previously 
discussed, Rollei was a specialist body producer and Yashica an integrated firm.  
In order to test whether AE is a key feature, we re-estimated the SLR results while 
omitting AE from the equation. If the efficiency of certain Japanese cameras largely 
depends on the presence of AE (i.e. they are not efficient with respect to the other 
 39 
features) then we expect to see a very different set of cameras on the frontier if the AE 
variable is removed. This is indeed what we find (see Table A1 in the Appendix). A 
larger number of non-Japanese firms are present on the efficiency frontier when AE 
is omitted. This confirms that AE was a key feature affecting the price/performance 
competitiveness of Japanese firms in the SLR market. 
10.  Discussion and Conclusions  
The case study provides a number of interesting insights into the link between stra-
tegic innovation and the mirroring hypothesis. With relatively minor changes to the 
existing camera designs, new Japanese start-ups were able to offer a new feature – AE 
- that was attractive to professional users. Importantly, the camera’s post-innovation 
architecture was not substantially less modular than the pre-innovation architecture. 
This enabled the user to easily revert back to all-manual mode, with the camera work-
ing in exactly the same mechanical fashion as an all-mechanical camera. A market 
shake-out occurred as new Japanese start-ups tied access to this new feature with pro-
prietary interface standards, forcing consumers to make a choice between rival inte-
grated firms that could offer both lens and body combinations. This led to a ‘breaking’ 
of the mirror between the product modularity and organizational modularity as there 
followed a rapid change in the industry structure, from specialist to vertically inte-
grated firms. 
The emphasis on physical interfaces in this paper is in the tradition of Ulrich (1995), 
Ulrich and Eppinger (2008), Langlois and Robertson (1992) and Langlois (2002), and 
is also consistent with the notion of interface standards within the standards literature 
(e.g. Swann, 1987; Swann and Taghavi 1992).  
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There exist other definitions of interfaces and standards within the mirroring hypoth-
esis literature. In terms of knowledge (cf. Henderson and Clark, 1990), the develop-
ment of AE did not alter the underlying technological knowledge of optics and lens 
manufacture. Nor did it alter the underlying technological knowledge of camera body 
and focal plane shutter mechanics or manufacture. Moreover, the early application of 
AE on SLR cameras tapped into a component - through-the-lens exposure metering 
– that was already present on manual SLR cameras. It was not a different set of engi-
neering and scientific principles that created difficulties for established firms, or pro-
vided the basis for the successful entry of new firms (Henderson and Clark, ibid).  
An interesting question is why German lens and body specialists, who had originally 
developed the open M42 standard, were unable to effectively respond to new, inte-
grated Japanese producers. There was clearly a coordination failure on the part of 
German producers to agree upon and coordinate a switch to a proprietary standard 
(cf. Farrell and Saloner 1989). This could have been one of the proprietary bayonet 
standards of a Japanese firm, or else their own proprietary bayonet standard.  
There were two German companies with in-house body and lens capabilities who 
could potentially have developed a German proprietary standard - Zeiss Ikon and 
Leica. Zeiss Ikon was one part of the Carl Zeiss Foundation, the other being the Carl 
Zeiss camera lens and optical firm. The company was formed through the pre-war 
merger of four camera makers (Contessa-Nettel, Ernemann, Goerz and Ica), and an 
infusion of capital by Zeiss. Zeiss Ikon belatedly developed an SLR model with AE, 
the ‘Contarex Electronic’, which was launched in 1969. This proved too little, too late 
to save the company from closure in 1972.  
Leica’s idiosyncratic management during the 1950s meant it stayed in 35mm range-
finder production rather than moving into 35mm SLRs. When it did launch its first 
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SLR camera, the Leicaflex in 1964, this was deemed to be overpriced and underspec-
ified compared to Nikon and Canon models, and more suitable for the amateur than 
the professional user (Schnaars 1994). As Bruno Frey, Leica’s President in 1988, con-
ceded, “Leica [hadn’t] had a strategy attuned to the market … Leica just gave up the 
market to the Japanese” (Fuhrman 1988, p. 100). 
This is sympathetic to the criticism that modular product architectures, in themselves, 
do not provide the information needed by different actors to coordinate activity 
through the market mechanism (Brusoni et al. 2001; Brusoni 2005; Hobday et al. 2005; 
and Brusoni and Prencipe 2006). Decisions regarding product restructuring - parti-
tion, recombine, or (in our case study) develop improved interfaces – are strategic 
choices. It is the visible hand of organisations driving strategy, not the invisible logic 
of a product architecture. 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) have a still broader understanding of the relationship be-
tween thick/thin crossing points at the boundaries of modules, transaction costs be-
tween firms, and the network of organizational ties in an industry. The ‘crossing 
point’ necessary for AE was not substantially ‘thicker’ than that of pre-AE cameras. 
Our empirical findings highlight the importance of interface innovation as a key in-
novation strategy for developing new features while the core principles underlying 
the rest of the camera’s functioning did not change.  
The successful introduction of AE on SLR cameras was to change the direction of 
product innovation in the pro-innovation period. The new interface facilitated the de-
velopment of further novel automation features such as autofocusing and automated 
zoom lenses. These are all founded on the passing of electrical information between 
the lens and the camera body. This raised the degree of interdependency (a thickening 
of the crossing point) between the lens and body modules in the post-innovation era. 
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As discussed, the early AE mechanisms were mechanical. Later on, successful Japa-
nese firms began to apply electronics to their designs. These new competences ena-
bled them to further distance themselves, in technology and in product performance, 
from their European and U.S. rivals. 
Looking forward, interface innovation is a powerful, though typically overlooked, in-
novation strategy that facilitates the development of novel product features (service 
characteristics) in complex products. It is hoped that this paper will encourage re-
search on interface innovation and industry structure, as well as other strategies that 
have led to industries in which integrated organizations produce modular products, 
or else there are modular organizations producing integrated products.  
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The efficiency of a selected unit 𝑘 under variable returns to scale (Banker et al. 1984) 
can be written in the envelopment form as follows: 
 







𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑦𝑟𝑗 − 𝑆𝑟 = 𝑦𝑟𝑘 
𝑛
𝑗=1
  (𝑟 = 1,2, … , 𝑠) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑍𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘 − ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑆𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1






𝜆𝑗 , 𝑆𝑟 , 𝑆𝑖 ≥ 0         𝑍𝑘  − 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 
 
Where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 and 𝑦𝑟𝑗 are the quantities of the ith input and the rth output of the jth unit, 
and 𝜀 is a small positive number.   
The above can be solved as a straightforward linear programming problem. The pro-
gramme is solved for each unit in the sample and hence an efficiency score 𝑍𝑘  is gen-
erated for each one. A unit is termed efficient if its efficiency rating (𝑍𝑘  ) obtained from 
the DEA model is equal to one. Units that achieve an efficiency score below one 
(𝑍𝑘<1) are deemed inefficient. The envelopment surface obtained from this model re-
sults in a convex hull. 
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Figure A1 shows the constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale 
(VRS) frontiers for a single input and single output system for five units labelled A to 
E. If CRS is assumed then the relevant frontier is a straight line ray from the origin 
and going through point C. C is therefore the only efficient unit since it lies on the 
frontier. For VRS, the frontier is formed by units A, C and E. The remaining units are 
classified as inefficient since they do not lie on the frontier.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure A1 Here 
---------------------------- 
Figure A2 shows the efficient frontier for a multiple input situation for the case where 
output is constant across DMUs that produce using two inputs. The efficiency fron-
tier is represented by line CAD. E and B both lie above this frontier and are therefore 
deemed inefficient. DMU E would need to reduce its inputs to the amounts used by A 
if it is to be efficient.    
---------------------------- 





Table 1. Equivalent Combinations of Lens Aperture and Shutter Speed at EV11.  
 
Aperture 
Bokeh  <--------------------------------------------------------------->    All in focus 
 
F f/1.4 f/2 f/2.8 f/4 f/5.6 f/8 f/11 f/16 f/22 f/32 
T 1/1000 1/500 1/250 1/125 1/60 1/30 1/15 1/8 1/4 1/2 
      
Shutter speed 




 Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Median S.D. No. observations  
price 188.61 160.37 137.36 1,816  
lens speed 2.8 2.8 1.6 1,816  
shutter speed 9.6 10 2.7 1,816  
electronic shutter 0.02 0 0.15 1,816  
automatic exposure 0.06 0 0.22 1,816  
interchangeable lens 0.68 1 0.47 1,816  
internal metering 0.44 0 0.49 1,816  
built-in motor 0.08 0 0.27 1,816  





Table 3. Number of Distinct Cameras in the Sample, By Camera Type 
 










Table 4. Number of Camera listings in the Sample, By Country of Origin 
Country Number of Cameras 
Japan 344 
West Germany 131 
East Germany  72 
UK  14 
US   8 
Sweden   6 
Hong Kong   3 
China   1 
France   11 
Italy   5 
Poland   2 
Czech   6 
Soviet Union  12 
Monaco   1 












West Germany 11 
East Germany  4 
UK  8 
US  2 
Sweden  1 
Hong Kong  1 
China  1 
France   3 
Italy  2 
Poland  1 
Czech  1 
Soviet Union  1 
Monaco  1 
Switzerland  1 











1-5 39 56 
6-10 12 17 
11-20 10 14 
21-30 2 3 
31-40 5 7 
Over 40 2 3 





Table 7.  New Models Introduced with Automatic Exposure, by Year (1955 – 1974). 
Year Camera Type Country No. of Cameras 
1961 35mm SLR Japan  2 
1962 35mm SLR Japan  1 
 35mm SLR West Germany  2 
1963 35mm SLR Japan  2 
 TLR West Germany  1 
1964 35mm SLR Japan  1 
 TLR Japan  1 
1965 35mm SLR Japan  2 
1966 35mm SLR Japan  2 
1967 35mm SLR Japan  2 
1969 35mm SLR West Germany  2 
1970 35mm SLR Japan  2 
1971 35mm SLR Japan  4 
1972 35mm SLR Japan  4 
1973 35mm SLR Japan 10 





Table 8. Number of Efficient MF-SLR, Hasselblad-Type Models by Year, Country, and Integrated Firms (VRS) 
 
 
Medium Format-SLR Hasselblad-type 




No. of  
Integrated 
Firms 




No. of  
Integrated 
Firms 
1955 UK 1 0 - - - 
1956 UK 1 0 Sweden  1 0 
1957 UK 1 0 Sweden  1 0 

















































Japan 2 0 







   




























































































Table 9. Number of Efficient TLR, 35mm SLR Models by Year, Country, AE, and Integrated Firm (VRS) 
  
TLR 35mm-SLR 
Year Country Total 
No. of 
Firms  










Country Total No. 
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Cameras 
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Figure 1. Manual SLR Design Structure Matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Aperture ring (user control) .
2 Servo control (aperture blades)
3 Aperture blades X .
4 Optics size .
5 Lens casing diameter X X .
6 Lens weight X X .
7 M42 screw thread interface .
8 Lever reset .
9 Interior dark sealing (box) .
10 User control (shutter speed) .
11 Servo control (shutter speed)
12 Shutter release button .
13 Focal plane shutter X X .
14 Film wind mechanism .
15 Battery .
16 CdS photocell X .
17 ISO Dial .
18 Exposure meter X X X .
19 Reflex mirror .
20 Pentaprism .
21 Viewfinder/Focusing screen X X .
22 Body Size X X X X X X X .
23 Body Weight X X X X X X X X .
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Aperture ring (user control) .
2 Servo control (aperture blades)
3 Aperture blades X .
4 Optics size .
5 Lens casing diameter X X .
6 Lens weight X X .
7 M42 screw thread interface .
8 Lever reset 
9 Interior dark sealing (box) .
10 User control (shutter speed) .
11 Servo control (shutter speed) . X
12 Shutter release button .
13 Focal plane shutter X X .
14 Film wind mechanism .
15 Battery .
16 CdS photocell X .
17 ISO Dial .
18 Exposure meter X X X X .
19 Reflex mirror .
20 Pentaprism .
21 Viewfinder/Focusing screen X X .
22 Body Size X X X X X X X .
23 Body Weight X X X X X X X X .
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Aperture ring (user control) .
2 Servo control (aperture blades) . X
3 Aperture blades X X .
4 Optics size .
5 Lens casing diameter X X .
6 Lens weight X X .
7 M42 screw thread interface .
8 Lever reset 
9 Interior dark sealing (box) .
10 User control (shutter speed) .
11 Servo control (shutter speed)
12 Shutter release button .
13 Focal plane shutter X X .
14 Film wind mechanism .
15 Battery .
16 CdS photocell X .
17 ISO Dial .
18 Exposure meter X X X .
19 Reflex mirror .
20 Pentaprism .
21 Viewfinder/Focusing screen X X .
22 Body Size X X X X X X X .
23 Body Weight X X X X X X X X .
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Figure 5. Annual Number of Camera Listings from Japan, West Germany, and Rest of the World 
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Figure A1. CRS and VRS Efficiency Frontiers in the Single Input and Single Output Case 
 




































Table A1. Number of Efficient 35mm SLR Models by Year, Country, AE, and Integrated Firm (VRS) Excluding AE Feature  
35mm-SLR 
Year Country Total No. 





AE       
Cameras 
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1974 E. Germany  
W. Germany 
Japan 
2 
1 
8  
0 
0 
8  
0 
0 
3 
0 
0 
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